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Transparency is now seen as a key tool of democratic governance. The European Union‘s 
commitment to transparency is now at the centre of a crucial debate between the Commission 
and the Parliament on the future of citizen‘s right of access to information. This article 
presents the main characteristics of the current regime and questions the pertinence of the 
proposed changes in light of the international drive at modernising access to information laws 
and the attempt at identifying the ‗proper limits of transparency‘. The questions raised range 
from the identification of what can be accessed to the definition of exemption and the 
protection of competing interests. 
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1 INTRODUCTION: THE ‘INEXORABLE RISE’ OF DOCUMENTARY 
TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency is a general paradigm focused on opening internal organizational processes and 
decisions to third parties, whether or not they are involved in the organization
1
. It rest upon a 
non-negotiable ‗right to know‘2, whose connection to the fundamental freedom ―to seek, 
receive and impart information‖ (art. 19 UDHR) is increasingly recognized3. 
Transparency, as a legal right, can be activated through a number of different laws and 
procedures. Over the last 20 years, one of the key instruments of transparency has been access 
to information laws (ATI). These laws give individuals the opportunity to request, without 
need to justify or substantiate the request, information, or a document containing the desired 
information. Citizens thus have a legally guaranteed right of access to information held by the 
authorities. This right is qualified by a specific and limited number of exceptions and 
exemptions to the general rule of disclosure. The main objective of ATI is to force the 
authorities to disclose what they would rather keep secret. This represents, for administrations 




This ‗documentary transparency‘ has come to be seen as a cornerstone of administrative 
democracy
5
. Today over 80 countries have implemented ATI laws. In 1766 Sweden was the 
first country to give citizens the legal right to access information detained by public sector 
organisations. In the 1960s, it is the enactment of the American Freedom of Information Act 
(1966) that influenced a spur of ATI legislations, e.g. Norway (1970), Australia (1982), 
Denmark (1985), and the United Kingdom (2000)
6
. Since the 1990s, the adoption of such 
                                                     
1
 FLORINI, A. (1998) The end of secrecy. Foreign Policy, 111, 50-63. 
2
 FUNG, A., GRAHAM, M. & WEIL, D. (2003) The political economy of transparency: What makes disclosure 
policies sustainable. John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University. OPEN GOVERNMENT 
(2004) Freedom of information coalition. Freedom of Information Coalition. POPE, J. (2003) L'accès à 
l'information: Qui y a droit et à quelle information? Rapport mondial sur la corruption 2003. 
3
 See HINS, W. & VOORHOOF, D. (2007) Access to State-Held Information as a Fundamental Right under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, European Constitutional Law Review, 3, 114-126. 
4
 ROBERTS, A. (2005) Spin control and freedom of information lessons for the United Kingdom from Canada. 
Public Administration, 83, 1-23. 
5
 OECD (2005) Engaging citizens in policymaking. Paris, OECD. 
ROBERTS, A. (2007) Future challenges for the RTI movement. Fifth Annual International Conference of 
Information Commissioners. Wellington. 
6
 BANISAR, D. (2006) Freedom of information around the world 2006: A global survey of access to 
government information laws. Privacy International. HOOD, C. & HEALD, D. (Eds.) (2006) Transparency: The 
key to better government?, Oxford, British Academy/Oxford University Press. 
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legislation has greatly accelerated, in part as a development of the rise of both administrative 
democracy and democratic governance.  
The foregoing observations apply in full to the European Union, where a right to the public 
access of documents has now been in existence for more than fifteen years. 
The Union and its forerunner, the European Community, were traditionally secretive 
organizations
7
. Until the early 1990s, only interested parties enjoyed rights of access to 
administrative files concerning them personally
8
, while sweeping provisions protecting 
business secrecy and the confidentiality of the institution‘s deliberations were (and still are) 
widespread (see e.g. art. 339 TFEU and art. 6, annex III of the Staff Regulations). 
The EU first expressed a commitment to ―transparency‖ through a declaration added to the 
Maastricht Treaty (Declaration n° 17 ―on the right of access to information‖). Concrete steps 
were then taken in midst of a legitimacy crisis, after the Danish negative referendum on the 
Treaty
9. The Council and the Commission agreed a common ―Code of conduct‖ on 
transparency, and amended accordingly their Rules of Procedure by granting the ―public‖ a 
limited, but legally enforceable right of access to their documents. This was the first step of 
the EU in the direction of a true ATI legislation. 
After such modest beginnings, access to information has known a ―slow but inexorable rise‖10 
in the hierarchy of EU constitutional principles. With the Treaty of Amsterdam, access to 
―European Parliament, Council and Commission documents‖ has been formally enshrined in 
primary law as a right of EU citizens and residents (Art. 255 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, TEC)
11
. The Treaty of Lisbon, which has only just come in force, has 
taken this process further in several ways: 
- First, it has placed beyond discussion the fact that the public right of access to documents 
is a fundamental right of EU citizens and residents (see Art. 6 TEU and Art. 42 EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, CFR). 
                                                     
7
 See GRØNBECH-JANSEN, C (1998) The Scandinavian tradition of open government and the European 
Union: problems of compatibility?, Journal of European Public Policy, 5, 185-199, at  190; DYRBERG, P 
(1999), Current issues in the Debate on Public Access to Documents, European Law Review, 24, 157-710, at 
160. 
8
 And that, mostly, thanks to the case-law of the European Court of Justice: see ECJ, C-135/92, Fiskano, [1994] 
ECR I-2885. 
9
 See BRADLEY, K. (1999) La transparence de l‘Union européenne: une evidence ou un trompe-l‘oeil?, Cahiers 
de droit européen, 35, 283-362, at 319-320. 
10
 AG Poiares Maduro, C-64/05P, Sweden/Commission, [2007] ECR I-11389, para. 37. 
11
 This new article was mirrored in an amendment to Art. 1 of the Treaty on the European Union, inserting a 
reference to open government within the EU. 
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- Second, it has linked, more eloquently than ever before, this right to broader principles of 
open government, good governance, and participatory democracy (see art. 10(3) TEU 
and 15(1)(2) TFEU).  
- Third, it has laid down the principle that all ―Union institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies‖ must grant public access to their documents, subject to partial exemptions for 
the European Central Bank, European Investment Bank, and EU Courts (see art. 15(3), 
the successor of art. 255 TEC). 
The rise of transparency in EU primary law is of course only part of the story. With the 
possible exception of article 42 CFR, the above-mentioned provisions are not directly 
enforceable
12. They do recognise a right of access to documents, but this right is ―subject to 
the principles and the conditions to be defined‖ by secondary legislation, which must in 
particular determine ―limits on grounds of public and private interest‖ (see art. 15(3) TFEU). 
In EU law, it is therefore secondary legislation that makes of access to documents a legally 
enforceable right, and it is secondary legislation that defines in detail its object and scope, as 
well as its limitations vis-à-vis competing interests. 
The key instrument in the area is currently Regulation (EC) n° 1049/2001 ―regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents‖ (Regulation 1049)13. 
This Regulation coexists with a number of special rules concerning access to particular 
categories of documents – such as Regulation (EC) n° 1367/2006 on ―environmental 
information (the Aarhus Regulation)‖14 – or access to the documents of particular EU bodies.  
In April 2008, the European Commission has tabled a proposal to amend Regulation 1049, 
which is now being examined by the European Parliament and Council (the Recast 
proposal)
15. The Commission has presented it as part of a ―drive towards more 
transparency‖16. In order to evaluate the validity of such a claim, the present paper will 
analyze and critically assess the most salient aspects of the proposal (sections D.2 and E). As 
a necessary background, we will recall the central objectives for transparency and ATI laws 
(section B), the basic features of access to documents under current EU law (section C), as 
well as the key items on the transparency reform agenda in the EU and elsewhere (section 
D.1).  
                                                     
12
 CFI, T-191/99, Petrie, [2001] ECR II-3677, 34; AG Poiares Maduro, C-64/05P, cit, para. 39. The issue of 
whether art. 42 CFR has direct effect lies outside the scope of the present contribution. 
13
 OJ 2001 L 154/43. 
14
 OJ 2006 L 264/13. 
15
 COM (2008) 229 final. 
16
 Ibidem, para. 1.2. 
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It is an understatement to say that the Recast proposal has not been well received. As it will 
be seen, it does at least have the merit of identifying a number of relevant questions, which 
are usually overlooked by transparency advocates. The answers it provides to them, 
unfortunately, appear distinctively regressive. 
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2 THE ‘ARGUMENTS’ FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ATI LAWS 
Public access to documents is both a legal right and a tool. Its development is based on three 
postulates: 1) the ‗Governance Argument‘; 2) the ‗Trust Argument‘; and 3) the ‗Participation 
Argument‘. 
The Governance Argument 
Access to governmental information, and its subsequent diffusion, gives power to all societal 
stakeholders to peer through the outer walls of governmental organisations. This possibility, 
whether it is activated or not through ATI requests, is believed to create an atmosphere more 
conducive to effective and efficient management of policies and delivery of services. 
―Sunlight is a great disinfectant‖17 ATI is here yet another mechanism pushing for greater 
accountability and efficiency of public organisations.  
The Trust Argument 
Transparency is also intended to improve relations between public authorities and citizens. In 
a context marked by the ever-present problem of public deficits
18
, the loss of confidence in 
the authorities
19
 demands for greater accountability on the part of those in power
20
 and the 
fight against corruption
21
, access to information makes it possible to reverse some of these 
trends and to re-establish more harmonious relations between authorities and citizens. It is 
believed that by ‗shining a light‘ within organisations and diffusing information on their 
operations and processes, a greater level of trust can be attained. 
The Participation Argument 
Transparency is, finally, a tool which promotes the co-participation of the people in the 
development and implementation of public policies. There is a growing trend for the public to 
participate in decision making and in the policy processes of the State
22
. A more active 
                                                     
17
 MURDOCK, CW, Sarbanes-Oxley Five Year Later: Hero or Villain, Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, 
39, p.568 
18
 OECD (1999) Fiscal transparency. Paris, OECD. 
19
 VAN DE WALLE, S. & BOUCKAERT, G. (2003) Comparing Measures of Citizen Trust and User 
Satisfaction as Indicators of 'Good Governance': Difficulties in Linking Trust and Satisfaction Indicators. 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 69, 329-343. 
20
 SAVOIE, D. J. (2003) Breaking the bargain, Toronto, University of Toronto Press. 
21
  TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2004) Global corruption report. Berlin, Transparency International. 
22
 JUILLET, L. & PAQUET, G. (2001) Politique d'information et gouvernance. Ottawa, Gouvernement du 
Canada. OPEN GOVERNMENT (2004). 
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participation of the public in the governance of the state requires information of a higher 
quality and in a greater quantity. The transparency of state activities becomes, in this context, 
a sine qua non for the active participation of the public in the policy process. 
The emphasis put on these three arguments by various national legislations will vary. A 
proper understanding of the specific rationale for the introduction of an ATI law is necessary 
for any evaluation of its successful or unsuccessful implementation. It is on that basis that it 
will be evaluated. The importance given to one criteria or the other shall lead to relatively 
different options and solutions on the road to a well balanced approached between privacy 
and transparency. In Switzerland, for example, the federal government‘s first attempt at 
enacting an ATI law had the specific objective of positioning the state ‗closer to citizen via 
increased transparency‘23. When ‗la loi fédérale sur le principe de la transparence dans 
l'administration‘ or LTRANS was passed in December 2004, it was in order ―to promote the 
transparency of the mission, organization and activity of the administration. To this end, it 
contributes to public information by guaranteeing access to official documents‖24. 
The initial impetus for the development of an access to information legislation in the EU is by 
and large similar to that of most countries and integrates parts of the three arguments 
presented above. 
Regulation 1049, in particular, identifies the main objectives in establishing a European ATI 
law: ‗participation‘, ‗legitimacy‘, ‗accountability‘ and ‗democracy‘. ―Openness enables 
citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the 
administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the 
citizen in a democratic system. Openness contributes to strengthening the principles of 
democracy and respect for fundamental rights …‖.25 Likewise, the Treaty on the functioning 
of the European Union identifies the benefits expected from ATI as ‗good governance‘ and 
the ‗participation of civil society‘. ―In order to promote good governance and ensure the 
participation of civil society, the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct 
their work as openly as possible‖ (art. 15(3)). 
                                                     
23
 CONSEIL FÉDÉRAL (2003) Message relatif à la loi fédérale sur la transparence de l'administration. 
24
 Loi fédérale du 17 décembre 2004 sur le principe de la transparence dans l‘administration (LTrans, RS 152.3). 
25
 Regulation 1049, recital 2, emphasis added. 
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3 ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS IN THE EU: CORE FEATURES AND OPEN 
QUESTIONS 
The current rules pertaining to ATI in the EU cover the same aspects as most ATI 
legislations. They define who can access information, what can be accessed, under what 
process it can be accessed, the time allotted for disclosure, the eventual fees to be paid and the 
redress procedures in the case of a refusal to communicate on the part of the authorities. Of 
these elements, fours aspects are of interest for our evaluation of the Recast proposal: 1) who 
has rights of access and what organisations are under ATI obligations; 2) what can be 
accessed, i.e. the definition of what is an accessible ―document‖; 3) the special rules on third 
party documents; and 4) the substantive principles regulating the exceptions to disclosure. 
3.1 THE SCOPE OF DOCUMENTARY TRANSPARENCY IN THE EU 
3.1.1 WHOSE ACCESS, TO WHOSE DOCUMENTS? 
As noted above, the Treaties only recognize the public right of access to documents to 
nationals and residents of a Member State. This right, which can be exercised without 
justification on the part of the requester (art. 6(1) Regulation 1049), is distinct from and 
without prejudice to ―privileged‖ rights of access under EU law, such as the right of every 
person to access his or her personal data held by the institutions (art. 8(2) CFR), or the rights 
of every person to have access to his or her file in an administrative procedure (art. 41(2) 
CFR). Conversely, interested parties are entitled like anybody else to obtain documents via 
their public right of access
26
 – and as a matter of fact they often take this route, partly because 
due process rights are insufficiently codified in EU legislation
27
. 
As for the organizations that are subject to transparency obligations under Regulation 1049, 
these are at present the Parliament, Council, and Commission. This is so because the 
Regulation was adopted under the old rules of the Amsterdam Treaty. The new rules, placing 
transparency obligations on all EU bodies, still await implementation. 
                                                     
26
 If they do so, however, their ―special‖ interest is entirely irrelevant, and the request must be treated as a 
request from any citizen to bring a document in the public domain: see ECJ, C-266/05P, Sison, [2007] ECR I-
1233, 43-48. In this particular case, non-disclosure of certain documents relating to the applicant was deemed 
compatible with the rules on public access, but subsequently judged as contrary to the applicant‘s ―rights of the 
defence‖ (CFI, T-47/03, Sison, [2007] ECR II-73, 210-214). 
27
 European Commission, Report on the implemenation of the principles in EC Regulation No 1049/2001, COM 
(2004) 45 final, paras. 3.10 and 7.2.1. 
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These two limitations – only EU citizens and residents have a public access right, and only 
vis-à-vis the three main institutions – do not apply in the case of ―environmental 
information‖28. But these limitations are not as strict as it may seem. On the one hand, the 
institutions ―may‖ – and in practice do – grant access to any person regardless of citizenship 
and residence (art. 2(2) Reg 1049)
29
. On the other hand, many EU bodies have been formally 
subjected to Regulation 1049 (e.g. EU agencies)
30
, and others still have voluntarily adopted 
identical or slightly less stringent transparency rules (e.g., the Committee of the Regions and 
the Court of Auditors)
31
. In other words, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty will not 
revolutionize matters – it will bring clarity in this area, and it will also subject some EU 
bodies to stricter transparency obligations than is the case today
32
. 
3.1.2 WHAT IS A ‚DOCUMENT‛? 
The foregoing discussion has taken for granted the notion of ―document‖, to which we must 
now turn. Under current law, a ―document‖ is defined as ―any content whatever its medium‖ 
(art. 3a Reg. 1049; see also art. 42 CFR). This is indeed an extremely broad definition, 
potentially covering formal documents, tape recordings of meetings, and, arguably, even 
―post it‖ notes drawn up by officials33. 
Be that as it may, an important point is that EU Law recognizes a right of access to 
―documents‖ not ―information‖. The distinction may seem a fine one, yet it carries one 
consequence: for a right of access to exist, the information (or ―content‖) must be contained in 
a pre-existing ―medium‖. In other words, EU institutions are not duty-bound to produce ―new 
documents‖ acting on a request for information34.  
This point deserves close attention, as it could potentially constitute the Achille‘s heel of EU 
transparency law. The latter‘s purposes can in fact be defeated if the institutions choose to 
                                                     
28
 Aarhus Regulation, art. 1 and 2 (a-c). 
29
 See DRIESSEN, B. (2008) Transparency in EU institutional law, London, Cameron May, para. 2.1. 
30
 See the Regulations published in OJ 2003 L 245, as well as Regulation (EC) n° 58/2003 (OJ 2003 L 11/1) on 
executive agencies. 
31
 See respectively the Rules of Procedures of the CoR (OJ 2010 L 6/14) and Decision n° 12/2005 of the Court 
of Auditors on public access to Court documents (OJ 2009 C 67/1). 
32
 In the intricate jungle of the Union‘s institutional framework, there are indeed bodies that apply weak rules of 
access on a voluntary basis (e.g. the European Council: see Rules of Procedure, OJ 2009 L 315/51, art. 4, 10 and 
11) or that do not apply any such rules at all (e.g. EU Courts, including for their non-judicial activities). 
33
 For a different position, see DRIESSEN (2008), p. 17. 
34
 See in particular CFI, T-264/04, WWF-EPP, [2007] ECR II-911, para. 75 ff; CFI, T-380/04, Terezakis, [2008] 
ECR II-11, 151 ff. In spite of its title, the Aarhus Convention ―on access to information, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, which has been given effect in the EU through 
the Aarhus Regulation, also provides for a right to access to ―documents‖. This is so because it defines 
―information‖ as ―any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other material form‖ (art. 2(3) 
Aarhus Convention; see further DRIESSEN (2008), p. 16-17). 
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keep ―off the record‖ the information they want to shield from public scrutiny35. The point is 
important, also, because it highlights a core functional need of EU transparency law: if the 
public is to know what documents are held by EU institutions, publicly accessible and 
comprehensive registers must be maintained. 
Current law establishes qualified duties on both points. 
Institutions must indeed draw up and maintain documentation of their activities (e.g. minutes 
of meetings) – but only ―insofar as possible‖: failure to do so will be considered unlawful 
only if ―unpredictable‖ or ―arbitrary‖36.  
As for registers, art. 11 Reg. 1049 requires institutions to set them up and to maintain them. 
However, it does not require them to include references to all their documents therein. It even 
falls short of establishing what documents, if any, must be referenced – a point which has 
recently given rise to disagreement between the EU Ombudsman and the Commission
37
.  
It may be readily conceded that a rigid obligation to put on record every spoken word, and to 
reference everything falling in the broad definition of ―document‖ in a register, would be 
unreasonable and disproportionate
38
. At the same time, it is quite clear that the law as it stands 
opens up a tempting space for the institutions to adopt ―avoidance strategies‖39. 
3.2 THIRD PARTY DOCUMENTS AND MEMBER STATES’ RIGHTS TO 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Following from the previous discussion, it is now important to note that the ―documents of‖ 
EU institutions are currently defined as the documents ―held‖ by EU institutions, whatever 
their author (see art. 2(3) Reg. 1049). This constitutes a major step forward from pre-
Amsterdam law, which limited access to documents ―drawn up‖ by the institutions  through 
                                                     
35
 PASQUIER, M. & VILLENEUVE, J.-P. (2006) Access to information in Switzerland. From secrecy to 
transparency. Open Government, September-October. 
36
 CFI, WWF-EPP, cit., paras. 61-63. It is noteworthy that in this case, the Council radically denied the existence 
of any rule to the effect that it should ―minute‖ meetings (para. 59). It is also noteworthy that the CFI held that 
failure to minute a ―purely informative‖ debate, which was not functional to the adoption of any implementation 
measure, was not in breach of the duty described above (para. 62). 
37
 Complaint 3208/2006/GG (―Statewatch case‖). The Ombudsman‘s position is that each ―relevant‖ document 
should be included in the register (see final remark, together with a summary of the Commission‘s reply, in EU 
Ombudsman (2009), Follow-up to Critical and Further Remarks – How the EU Institutions responded to the 
Ombudsman‘s Recommendations in 2008, p. 35). The Commission has maintained that in enjoys broad 
discretion in this respect, and that while ―legislative‖ documents should be systematically included, it can 
legitimately exclude documents relating e.g. to trade defence and competition law procedures (see full-text letter 
of the Commission, dated 30 September 2009, available on www.statewatch.org). 
38
 On this point see EU Ombudsman (2007) Response to the Commissions green paper ―Public access to 
documents held by institutions of the European Community: a review‖, p. 6-7. 
39
 See the facts of the WWF-EPP case cited above (―this document doesn‘t exist‖), as well as the documents 
relating to the Statewatch complaint to the EU Ombudsman. 
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the so-called ―authorship rule‖. The importance of this point can hardly be overstated: a vast 
proportion of the documents in the hands EU institutions, and many of those whose disclosure 
may be of interest to the public, are communicated by third parties. This is particularly true of 
documents transmitted by the Member States, who are closely involved in both policy-making 
and policy implementation in the EU.  
But this step was not taken without precautions, and access to third-party documents is 
covered by several special rules. The general rule, applying to any third-party document, is 
that the originator must be consulted prior to disclosure (art. 4(4) Reg. 1049). 
If the originator is a Member State, it has the special right to ―request the institution not to 
disclose the document‖ (art. 4(5) Regulation 1049). The meaning of this rather ambiguous 
provision was clarified in a landmark judgment of the European Court of Justice. The Court 
made it clear, first, that if the Member State concerned is opposed to disclosure, then the 
institution is duty-bound to refuse it. On the other hand, the Court clearly distinguished this 
right from an unconstrained ―veto right‖: following its judgment, a Member State may only 
oppose disclosure on the grounds enumerated in the Regulation, and the institution‘s decision 
refusing access is then subject to full judicial review by EU Courts
40
  
A true ―veto right‖ exists, by contrast, in the case of ―sensitive‖ documents (i.e. documents 
classified as ―confidential‖, ―secret‖ or ―top secret‖). For such documents, the originator 
(State, EU institution, or international organization) can even veto the inclusion of a reference 
in the institution‘s register (art. 9). 
3.3 THE PROTECTION OF COMPETING INTERESTS: EXCEPTIONS TO PUBLIC 
ACCESS 
3.3.1 OVERVIEW 
It is generally accepted that the objective of the right of access to documents is not absolute 
transparency but relative transparency: all access-to-documents laws provide, to a greater or 
lesser extent, for exemptions and limitations designed to protect competing interests that 
would be harmed by disclosure. That is also the case of public access to EU documents under 
art. 15(3) TFEU. We already noted two rules in this respect: the exemption of the EU Banks 
and Courts from transparency obligations, save in the exercise of their administrative tasks, 
and the ―veto right‖ accorded to the originator in respect of sensitive documents. 
                                                     
40
 ECJ, C-64/05P, Sweden/Commission, [2007] ECR I-11389, para. 43 ff. 
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The central provision is, however, article 4 of Regulation 1049. This article enumerates the 
interests whose protection may justify and exception to disclosure, and lays down 
differentiated principles for balancing them against the public‘s right to know: 
- Under paragraph 1, when disclosure would undermine public security (including defence 
and military matters), international relations, or economic policy broadly defined, access 
to a document must be refused (lit. a). The same applies to privacy and the integrity of the 
individual (lit. b). In order to apply one of these exceptions, the institution concerned 
must only carry out a ―harm test‖, i.e. ascertain whether disclosure would harm one of the 
relevant interests. 
- Under paragraph 2, the institutions must refuse access to documents that would 
undermine the commercial interests of a legal or moral person, court proceedings, legal 
advice, or the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits. In order to apply one of 
these exceptions, the institution must carry out a harm test as under paragraph 1, and also 
consider whether there is an ―overriding public interest in disclosure‖41. 
- Under paragraph 3, finally, institutions must refuse access to documents relating to a 
matter where the decision has not been taken, when disclosure would seriously 
undermine the decision-making process. Opinions for internal use may be kept 
confidential, for the same reason, even after the decision has been taken. In such cases, an 
exception may only be justified on the basis of a qualified harm test (―seriously 
undermine‖), and unless there is an ―overriding public interest in disclosure‖.  
The interpretation and application of these exceptions has been, unsurprisingly, the main 
source of litigation under Regulation 1049
42
. Before examining the principles that have been 
developed by EU Courts, it is interesting to consider briefly the approach that the requested 
institutions, particularly the Commission and the Council, have taken in this matter. 
3.3.2 THE COUNCIL AND COMMISSION APPROACH: EXCEPTIONS OR ‚BLANKET‛ 
EXEMPTIONS? 
From the very outset, the Commission and the Council have shown particular reluctance in 
disclosing certain categories of documents, and have relied on article 4 Reg. 1049 to 
systematically refuse public access to them.  
                                                     
41
 For an interpretation of this formula, see ECJ, C-39/05P and 52/05P, Turco, [2008] ECR I-4723, para. 44-46. 
42
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jurisdictions.  
 - 15 - 
 
The Commission has, in particular, routinely resisted attempts to access its files relating on 
antitrust, state aid, and infringement procedures. Significantly, these documents are usually 
absent from the Commission‘s register43. Whenever interested parties, NGOs, or journalists 
have nonetheless requested access to them, the Commission has regularly invoked one or 
more of the grounds listed in article 4: protection of investigations, commercial interests, 
court proceedings, or ―space to think‖. More interesting than this bare fact are the arguments 
that the Commission has put forward to defend its practice. The pleadings in the case of 
Technische Glaswerke are as good as any. The case concerned access to the files of state aid 
procedures. The applicant, an interested party, had requested all the documents relating to its 
own state aid procedure, as well as those relating to a procedure concerning a competitor. 
Significantly, the Commission expressed its deep dissatisfaction with the fact that interested 
parties could try to obtain, via public access, the disclosure of documents they could not 
access under their ―privileged‖ rights44. It stopped short of arguing that Regulation 1049 did 
not apply, however, and invoked the exception relating to the protection of investigations 
instead. It did so in the following terms: 
―[A]s in [infringement] proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations, there must be, 
in aid investigation procedures, proper cooperation in good faith between the 
Commission and the Member State, which excludes third parties having access to 
documents relating to those procedures before they have been concluded‖45. 
The same kind of argument was advanced in Bavarian Lager II, where the applicant sought 
access to the names of interest representatives that had been consulted in an infringement 
procedure. At the time of the dispute, the infringement procedure had been closed for 
approximately six years. The Commission nonetheless argued that: 
―If the names of persons who provided information to the Commission [in the 
course of investigations relating to infringement procedures against Member 
States] could be disclosed against their will, the Commission could be deprived of 
a valuable source of information, putting at risk its ability to carry out such 
investigations‖. 
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Such arguments may well be based on sound considerations. But they are based on 
consideration so general as to apply to any investigation procedure. They do not tend to 
justify the refusal to disclose this or that particular document – rather, they seek the 
exemption of whole categories of documents.
46
 
Similar arguments were made for other categories of documents, the legal opinions provided 
by the institutions‘ legal services being another good case in point. Such documents are 
covered by a specific exception (art. 4(2) Reg. 1049). The institutions have usually refused 
access to them by relying on arguments tending to a thorough exemption from public access 
rules. Consider the following passage, from the Council‘s arguments in the Turco case: 
―[T]here is a general need for confidentiality in respect of legal advice on 
legislative questions, since, first, the disclosure of such advice could give rise to 
lingering doubts as to the lawfulness of the legislative act concerned and, 
secondly, the independence of its legal service would be compromised by 
systematic disclosure of that advice‖47. 
In this case, as in Bavarian Lager, the argument failed to convince the Courts. 
3.3.3 THE APPROACH OF EU COURTS: CASE-BY-CASE EXCEPTIONS 
Over the years, a substantial body of case law has accumulated on the exact scope and 
interpretation of the exceptions listed in article 4. While this case law is not exempt from 
obscurities and contradictions
48
, EU Courts have developed a number of well-established 
principles, which have been in part summarized by the Court‘s Grand Chamber in the 
aforementioned Turco judgment.  
The basic principle is that under the Regulation, which aims to ensure the ―widest possible 
access to documents‖ (art. 1), disclosure is the rule, and exceptions must be interpreted 
restrictively
49
. In itself, the principle is banal – but its implications are not. 
First of all, before they can apply an exception, the institutions must examine the content of 
each requested document – including where the request concerns a group of (unspecified) 
documents (e.g. ―the file relating to …‖). This duty is linked to a number of other key 
principles: 
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(a) The harm test that institutions must carry out under article 4 must be specific and 
concrete. In other words, before it can refuse access to a document, an institution must 
assess whether there are concrete and specific reasons to believe that disclosure would 
affect a protected interest, at the time when the request is made (for a reference to this all-
important time factor, see art. 4(7)).  
(b) Likewise, when an exception under art. 4(2) and (3) is considered, the institutions must 
assess in concreto whether there is an ―overriding public interest in disclosure‖. 
According to the Court of Justice, the interest in disclosure will normally be stronger in 
regard of documents relating to a legislative procedure, since ―the possibility for citizens 
to find out the considerations underpinning legislative action is a precondition for the 
effective exercise of their democratic rights‖50.  
(c) The concrete examination of each document is necessary i.a. because the requested 
institution must ascertain what parts of the document are indeed covered by an exception. 
The duty to give partial access, whenever possible, is clearly stated in art. 4(6) of the 
Regulation. 
It is not necessary to go into further details to show that the Courts have taken a 
fundamentally different approach from the Council and Commission. Of course, they have not 
been unreceptive to arguments based on the protection of public and private interest. In some 
respects, they have even taken a deferent approach – for instance, by affording the political 
institutions broad discretion in judging whether disclosure would harm public security, or any 
other public interest cited in art. 4(1a)
51
. However, EU Courts have constantly rejected the 
institutions‘ arguments tending to demonstrate that whole categories of documents should be 
excluded from public access. Such arguments have been usually dismissed as based on ―mere 
assertions‖ of ―hypothetical risks‖, i.e. as falling short of the demonstrating a concrete and 
―reasonably foreseeable risk‖ of harm to a protected interest.  
Courts have proved only slightly more sympathetic to the argument that the requisite 
document-by-document examination would entail a disproportionate amount of work. In the 
VKI case, the Court of First Instance reaffirmed the duty of a concrete examination even in 
situations where a large number of documents is requested. It did concede that in very 
exceptional cases the institution could dispense with it. But following art. 6(3) of the 
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Regulation, it pointed out that in such cases it was the institution‘s duty to consult the 
applicant and to actively seek and propose alternative, reasonable solutions
52
. 
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4 REFORMING THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS IN THE EU: REFORM 
AGENDAS AND CONCRETE PROPOSALS 
4.1 THE IMPETUS TO REVISE ATI LEGISLATION 
Access to information has been deemed, on the whole, a positive endeavour. After more than 
20 years of experience, the Canadian Commissioners concluded that ―[t]wo decades is not 
long in the life of a statutory right. Yet, in its short life, the Access to Information Act's ability 
to overcome barriers to openness, thrown up by a deeply-imbedded governmental culture of 
secrecy, has been put to test after test. The Act has risen to the challenge; it has shown its 
strength to overcome barriers of unreasonable delay, fees and application of exemptions‖53. 
The EU Ombudsman has expressed similar views in 2007: ―Moving to a situation in which 
availability of information is the norm and confidentiality the exception involves a major 
cultural change. Whilst the situation is by no means perfect, the Union‘s institutions have, in 
the period since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, made real progress towards greater 
transparency‖54. 
Positive reviews do not, of course, preclude the need for modifications and improvements. 
Either through full-blown revisions or more simply through administrative review procedures, 
numerous countries are re-evaluating if not the fundamental impetus for transparency at least 
its modalities and applications. Currently, the governments of the United Kingdom, Scotland, 
New Zealand, Australia, Mexico and India are reviewing their ATI laws. The general trend is 
favouring a greater transparency and more stringent access to information laws. In the 
European Union, the debate on revising Regulation 1049 has started in 2006, with an EP 
resolution calling for immediate proposals
55
. This was followed in 2007 by a Commission 
Green Paper
56
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In the EU and elsewhere, the current discussion surrounding ATI touches several key points, 
examined below: 
 Defining what organisations should fall under ATI; 
 Defining exactly what type of information/document can be requested;  
 Dealing with classified information and documents coming from third parties; 
 Fine-tuning the scope of the exceptions and exemptions to the public right of access. 
 Evaluating the administrative costs of transparency; 
 Improving the transparency of legislative, regulatory and policy processes. 
For the purpose of the following discussion, it should be borne in mind that several of these 
items on the EU reform agenda are inextricably linked to an overarching, and somewhat more 
technical preoccupation: that of clarifying the legislative framework, by codifying the 
principles emerging from the case-law and/or by articulating more explicitly the relationship 
between public access to documents, on the one hand, and privileged rights or special 
confidentiality rules, on the other hand. 
4.1.1 DEFINING WHAT ORGANISATIONS SHOULD FALL UNDER ATI  
The question of defining what organisations should fall under ATI legislation has central 
relevance in many jurisdictions, where three distinct and separate dynamics threaten directly 
the integrity of ATI regimes: the statutory exclusion of governmental organizations, often at 
their own requests
58
; the increasingly frequent creation of autonomous corporate bodies 
charged with carrying out public tasks, which are often  exempted from ATI obligations
59
; 
and the increasing externalisation of public tasks to private sector organisations
60
. 
In the EU, however, the Lisbon Treaty has effectively foreclosed the discussion in favour of a 
near-universal subjection of EU bodies to transparency obligations (see above, C.1). The 
question thus becomes simply one of aligning Regulation 1049 to the new Treaty rules by 
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4.1.2 DEFINING EXACTLY WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION/DOCUMENT CAN BE 
REQUESTED  
ATI legislations have different definitions of what can be requested. For example, in the case 
of Switzerland, only completed documents can be accessed.
62
 In other countries, such as 
Canada, the e-mails and personal expenses of civil servants can also be accessed.
63
 There is 
currently a trend towards widening the definition of documents and this despite some of the 
reservations emitted at the logistical and financial consequences of such modifications
64
. 
As we have seen, current EU Law needs no fundamental widening of the ―document‖ 
definition. The Commission has rather advocated a restriction thereof, by suggesting that 
some requirement of formalization or registration be included for the sake of legal certainty
65
. 
On the other hand, the inclusion of ―loose‖ information contained in databases is being 
considered. Whether and how such information is covered by the current definition is a matter 
of debate
66
. Be that as it may, there is a broad understanding that formal inclusion would 
contribute to keep the right of public access abreast of technological development
67
. 
4.1.3 DEALING WITH THIRD PARTY DOCUMENTS 
Most governments, and especially those in multilevel systems of government, receive 
numerous documents and information from third parties. As we have seen, this aspect is 
covered by special rules under Regulation 1049.  
The question of the management and right of access to give to these documents still remains 
to be resolved in most ATI jurisdictions. It is clear that this situation can and does result in 
decision directly contravening the spirit and letter of ATI legislations. The ―security of 
information‖ agreements developed by the American government constitute a textbook case 
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in this regard. They stipulate that measures must be taken by the country receiving 
information from the United States to protect it.
68
 
In this matter, as we have seen, article 9 of Regulation 1049 grants a full ―veto right‖ to the 
originator of sensitive documents. A better delimitation of the rights and privileges affecting 
such third party documents must be attained. The risk is the development of an ATI system 
that applies the lowest possible denominator; a case in which the benefits of ATI would most 
likely be suboptimal. The European Parliament, in particular, has been consistent in 
requesting the introduction of more stringent conditions on classification, coupled with a 
periodical review of the need to retain classification for particular documents. It also called 
for a better delimitation of the Member States‘ rights to oppose disclosure of ―their‖ 
documents – but this was before the Court of Justice made it clear that this was no 
unconditional veto right (above, C.2). 
4.1.4 FINE-TUNING THE SCOPE OF THE EXCEPTIONS AND EXEMPTIONS TO THE 
PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS 
The balance between the right of public access against competing interests is largely 
contingent on the formulation of the exceptions to transparency obligations, and on the 
procedural mechanisms for their implementation. In many jurisdictions, the discussion 
focuses on the exceptions relating to public security and international relations. Many criticise 
the overextension of such justification to effectively trump ATI rules. 
In the European Union, the Commission has instead largely focused the debate on the 
protection of commercial interest and data protection. Though stating the point in 
interrogative form, the 2007 Green Paper clearly suggested that more protection could be 
afforded to such interests – a point on which many qualified respondents disagreed69. 
The Commission also suggested that clearer rules, imposing disclosure or non-disclosure in 
particular circumstances, could be ―distilled‖ from the ―case-by-case‖ exceptions contained in 
the Regulation. This, the Commission argued, could favour legal certainty. 
4.1.5 EVALUATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF TRANSPARENCY 
The cost of transparency is high on the reform agenda and is in many ways tied with the 
development of proper strategies to create, use and archive documents and information. 
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Transparency is not free. Despite savings resulting from transparency (better information and 
control of costs) the fact remains that documentary transparency is expensive. For example, 
each official demand for information under the Canadian Freedom of Information Act costs 
on average 2000 CND dollars.
70
  For the year 2000 in the United States, the cost of 
information demands — after deduction of fees collected — amounted to 253 million 
dollars.
71
 Given the many financial problems that governments are faced with today, there is 
certainly a strong temptation to reduce these budgets or to increase the direct cost of making 
an access to information request
72
 As fees are also a way of impeding access to information, 
the financial question soon becomes one of policy effectiveness. The question of ATI 
resources is not only financial. Some argue that too much openness does in fact directly 
hamper the delivery of services. ―'In terms of efficiency, too much openness will deflect 
resources away from the provision of essential public service and services.'
73
 The current 
challenge is to strike a balance between on the one hand ballooning costs, direct and indirect, 
the desire through financial means of restricting access and on the other the viability of a 
transparency approach that has proven its value over time. 
In its consultation documents, the Commission placed considerable emphasis on this aspect. It 
did mention better information management as the key response to the problem. But it went 
on to suggest that more flexibility could be allowed to the institutions to reject ―excessive‖ or 
―abusive‖ applications for access, and that a system of invoicing could be introduced74. The 
proposal to introduce ―per se‖ rules applying to well-defined cases, instead of ―case-by-case‖ 
exceptions may also be considered in this light: by their very nature, ―per se‖ rules would 




4.1.6 IMPROVING THE TRANSPARENCY OF LEGISLATIVE, REGULATORY AND 
POLICY PROCESSES  
The ‗protection‘ of key aspects of the policy process from transparency, this ‗space to think‘, 
is aimed at guaranteeing the voicing of possibly uncomfortable truths. National and EU ATI 
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legislations cover and protect such a space. But, the growing jurisprudence has delimited in an 
increasingly precise way how large, or how small, that protective bubble should be.  
In the case of Canada, the elements located within a minister‘s office are excluded from the 
reach of ATI and in Switzerland access to a document can be refused if it is susceptible to 
hamper the free formation of opinion
76
. Some criticism has been voiced as to the increasingly 
narrow place given to this protection
77
, while other point to the reaction of administration in 
abusing the protections accorded in the law
78
. The question remains one of balance, how 
much and how little transparency is needed in policy processes? What should be the scope of 
‗legislative transparency‘? 
This issue is particularly salient in the EU, whose key decision-making processes are still in 
part shrouded by secrecy. In its 2006 resolution, the European Parliament called for a 
differentiated approach, and advocated for ―full transparency‖ in law-making and regulatory 
procedures. According to the EP, ―full transparency‖ would mean direct access to all 




This stance clearly reflects the ―participation‖ rationale for public access to documents (see 
above, B). However, as observed in particular by the EU Ombudsman, it runs the risk of 
weakening the case for strong administrative transparency, thus neglecting the ―trust‖ and 
―good governance‖ rationales for public access to documents. 
4.2 THE RECAST PROPOSAL TABLED BY THE COMMISSION 
The various elements we have mentioned above all underline the tensions and difficulties in 
devising an ATI legislation that is workable and effective. It is by confronting such tensions 
and difficulties that an appropriate balance between administrative privilege and transparency 
rights must be achieved. This task is inherently a difficult one. It is made even more difficult 
by the biases that characterize this policy field. For, as the Canadian Commissioner stated in 
his annual report 2002-2003, ―…there remains a deep nostalgia in the bureaucracy for the 
days when officials controlled information and the spin of the message. Officials have not 
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given up the fight to weaken the law, but they have come to realize that the only effective 
strategy left to them is to rewrite the law.‖80  
The Commission has tabled its proposal to recast Regulation 1049. Is it part of a strategy to 
―rewrite the law‖ in its self-interest, or is it a true ―drive towards more transparency‖?  
The proposal contains a number of amendments, ranging from the relatively marginal (e.g. a 
slight extension of the time-limits for answering access requests) to the very important (e.g. 
revisiting the grounds for exceptions in art. 4). Within the limits of this paper, we will present 
and discuss a selection of the most salient aspects. 
4.2.1 THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF PUBLIC ACCESS RIGHTS 
Under the rubric of ―scope‖, one might be tempted to discuss the extension of transparency 
obligations to all EU bodies – which the proposal does not foresee, but which will nonetheless 
be implemented – and of transparency rights to all natural or legal persons – which the 
proposal foresees, but which might lack legal basis in article 15 TFEU. 
The important point is, however, the amended definition of ―document‖. This new definition 
would include ―data contained in electronic storage, processing and retrieval systems‖, 
provided that ―they can be extracted in the form of a printout or electronic-format copy using 
the available tools for the exploitation of the system‖. As said, this would broaden the scope 
of transparency, or at any rate codify good practice developed under Regulation 1049
81
.  
However, the new definition would also entail a potentially significant restriction. As far as 
documents drawn up by the institutions are concerned, it would only cover documents 
―formally transmitted to one or more recipients or otherwise registered‖ (art. 3(a) Recast). 
Commissioner Wallström has defended this amendment by pointing out that the present 
definition, potentially covering ―post it‖ notes drawn up by EU officials, entails ―a risk of 
ambiguity and bad practice‖82. And as said above, it may be readily conceded that access 
rules covering ―every scrap of paper‖, or requiring the registration thereof, could lead to 
undesirable results
83. Yet, in trying to avert this risk, the Commission‘s proposal gives rise to 
graver problems. Although the legal implications are not entirely clear, the new definition 
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would give the institutions, via their own internal rules on the registration of documents, 
considerable control on the actual scope of transparency.  
4.2.2 NEW EXEMPTIONS IN LIEU OF CASE-BY-CASE EXCEPTIONS 
Excluding ―scraps of papers‖ and ―post it‖ notes is not the only restriction proposed to the 
scope ratione materiae of the Regulation. The Recast proposal includes two absolute 
exemptions covering important formal documents, whose disclosure can at present be refused 
only on the basis of a concrete examination. 
The first exemption concerns the documents submitted by parties other than the institutions to 
Courts (art. 2(5) Recast). It reflects uncontroversial preoccupations – to respect the procedural 
autonomy of Courts, as well as the other parties‘ right to a fair trial – and it does not appear to 
bring significant limitations to transparency rights.   
The second exemption, by contrast, is harder to justify and would entail major consequences 
for access to documents in the EU. Under art. 2(6) Recast, the files relating to investigations 
or ―proceedings concerning an act of individual scope‖ would be temporarily excluded, until 
the closure of investigation or until the act becomes ―definitive‖ – i.e. until it cannot be 
challenged anymore or litigation has ended. Such documents would moreover be permanently 
excluded if they contain information obtained from natural or legal persons during 
investigations. 
The rationale behind this ―blanket‖ exemption is all too obvious: it would solve most of the 
problems the Commission faces under the current rules. To wit: 
- It would eliminate at the root any tension between privileged rights of access and public 
access, since it would strip public access of all utility for interested parties. Remarkably, 
no suggestion is made in the proposal to update and upgrade due process rights in EU 
administrative procedures. 
- It would also eliminate the friction existing between public access and special 
confidentiality rules regarding business secrecy, by sealing under permanent 
confidentiality the information submitted by undertakings. 
- To fully appreciate the point, it is worth recalling the Commission‘s long-standing 
argument that it needs absolute confidentiality in investigations in order to obtain 
cooperation (concerning information provided by the Member States, see below B2.4). 
But the exemption goes well beyond this point, covering also ―individual‖ procedures 
concerning e.g. the grant of EU funds or procurements. 
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- Last but not least, a ―blanket exemption‖ of this sort would drastically reduce the 
workload generated by requests of access addressed to the Commission, a great 
proportion of which concern competition law and public procurements
84
. 
It is barely the case to note that, whatever the advantages from the Commission‘s standpoint, 
the proposed provisions would drastically alter the balance between (administrative) 
transparency and competing interests. The Commission has argued that things would not 
change much, since the documents exempted are already covered by several exceptions under 
art. 4(2) and (3) Regulation 1049 (commercial interest; inspections, investigations, and audit; 
protection of the institution‘s decision-making process). The only difference would be that 
more clarity would be achieved, together with a cost reduction. But these arguments fail to 
convince.  
As the case-law of EU Courts amply shows, the documents whose exemption is sought are far 
from being ―automatically‖ covered by exceptions at present. Moreover, the Commission‘s 
proposal entirely disregards the option of partial access. 
4.2.3 THIRD-PARTY DOCUMENTS AND DOCUMENTS EMANATING FROM 
MEMBER STATES 
The Recast proposal does not include any alteration to the general rule on third-party 
documents (―consultation‖). Nor does it respond to the call of the European Parliament to 
limit the ―veto‖ right of the originator on the disclosure of sensitive documents. It does 
include, however, an important amendment to article 4(5) Regulation 1049, the key provision 
concerning documents originating from the Member States. This provision, as noted, states 
that ―a Member State may request the institution not to disclose a document originating from 
that Member State without its prior agreement‖. 
We have recalled earlier that the EU Court of Justice has interpreted this provision in a way 
that deprives Member States of a discretionary, unrestrained veto right. 
Art. 5(2) Recast purports to codify this ruling, but in fact it turns it on its head: 
―Where an application concerns a document originating from a Member State […] 
the authorities of that Member State shall be consulted. The institution holding the 
document shall disclose it unless the Member State gives reasons for withholding 
it, based on the exceptions referred to in Article 4 or on specific provisions in its 
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own legislation preventing disclosure of the document concerned (emphasis 
added).‖ 
This reads, precisely, like a power to veto disclosure on the basis of (suitably formulated) 
national legislation. Again, it is not difficult to see why the Commission wishes to include 
such a provision in the Regulation. Taken together with art. 2(6), examined above, it would 
shield most documents relating to infringement procedures from public scrutiny. The fact that 
this special rule would not apply to ―legislative‖ documents, as foreseen in the Recast, 
confirms this analysis. 
4.2.4 IMPROVING ‚LEGISLATIVE‛ AND ‚REGULATORY‛ TRANSPARENCY? 
The final point we would like to mention is article 12 of the Recast proposal, concerning 
registers and direct access.  
This provision makes it mandatory to include in registers, and to render directly accessible, all 
documents drawn up and received by the institutions in the course of ―legislative‖ and 
―regulatory‖ procedures – two terms that have acquired a precise legal signification with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (see art. 289 ff TFEU). There is nonetheless a reserve in 
favour of the exceptions laid down in art. 4, as well as of the special rules on sensitive 
documents (art. 9). 
As for other documents, and in particular documents ―relating to the development of policy 
and strategy‖, the recast proposal maintains a slightly reinforced version of the current rule: 
they ―shall‖ – instead of ―should‖ – ―be made directly accessible‖, but only ―where possible‖. 
These amendments respond, to some extent, to the call of the EP for increased transparency in 
law-making and policy-making. However, they fall short of establishing ―full transparency‖. 
More importantly, they stress once more the Commission‘s conception that while law-making 
and to some extent policy-making transparency are to be increased, administrative 
transparency should by contrast be somewhat restrained. Revealingly, the Recast proposal 
would do away with the general principle that ―the institutions shall as far as possible make 
[NoA: all] documents directly accessible‖ (art. 12(1) Regulation). This would be in effect 
replaced by the contrary principle that it is up to each institution to decide which ―other 
documents [NoA: than legislative, regulatory, and strategy documents] are directly 
accessible‖ (art. 12(4) Recast). 
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5 COMMENT: A ‚DRIVE TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENCY‛ OR A 
RETURN TO SECRECY? 
Can one say that ―less is more‖ in all circumstances? Only on this premise would the Recast 
proposal reflect a ―drive towards more transparency‖, as it purportedly does.  
The proposal‘s explanatory memorandum stresses the importance of the input received from 
the European Parliament and civil society. Yet, the operative text of the proposal is 
unmistakeably inspired by Commission‘s own agenda and conceptions, as consistently 
expressed in previous documents: extensive protection to the information provided by third-
parties, private undertakings or Member States, so as to facilitate i.a. investigative tasks; 
emphasis on ―legislative‖ transparency at the expenses of ―administrative‖ transparency; 
priority to reducing the costs and workload associated to the processing of access requests. 
Indeed, a striking feature of the proposal is that it constitutes a bid to enshrine in legislation 
the positions defended by the Commission and Council in judicial proceedings, and dismissed 
as too restrictive by the Courts. To recall, the proposal provides that: 
- All preparatory documents are exempted in the course of administrative procedures, until 
such procedures are closed; 
- Information collected from private parties during investigations or enquiries is 
permanently exempted; 
- The disclosure of documents obtained from Member States is essentially left to their bon 
vouloir,  
It is also worth recalling the ambiguous reference to ―formal registration‖ before the ―support 
of content‖ can indeed be considered as a ―document‖. 
True, the proposal includes a few progressive provisions, such as the extension of access 
rights to any legal or natural person, the provision on databases, or marginal improvements 
concerning legislative, regulatory, and policy transparency. On key aspects, and on balance, it 
nonetheless advocates a clear and drastic step back from the level of transparency afforded by 
current rules. As such, it goes against its own stated objectives, and the current international 
trend. 
Should we content ourselves of condemning the proposal as just this, a naked attempt by the 
EU bureaucracts to revert to the happier times of secrecy, a full concession to the “charmes 
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discrets du secret [des] deliberations”85? This is the position taken by many commentators, 
whose assumption is that ―more is always better‖, at least in the field of transparency.86 While 
this is an entirely respectable position, it is not our own. 
Transparency poses several challenges. The most obvious challenge is that of giving adequate 
protection to competing interests while not rendering access to documents nugatory. Public 
authorities must be at the same time transparent and fit for purpose, accountable and efficient. 
An somewhat less publicized challenge is that of pre-empting the defensive reactions of 
administrations and political bodies in the face of this new right, while at the same time taking 
seriously their legitimate preoccupations relating to the charge transparency represents, 
financially and otherwise. Simple ―more transparency is better‖ approaches tend to overlook 
these complexities.  
In this light, the propositions of the Commission could also be considered, more 
constructively, as a very imperfect attempt at facing these various challenges, and at devising 
an ATI legislation that does fulfil its ambitions and objectives. In the case of the EU, 
‗participation‘, ‗legitimacy‘, ‗accountability‘ and ‗democracy‘, ‗good governance‘ and the 
‗participation of civil society‘ (see section A1). Indeed, some of the innovations foreseen in 
the proposal could be justified by other, less self-serving rationales than direct attempts at 
thwarting transparency.  
Trying to avoid degenerations of the right of access to documents, by introducing some 
certainty as to the limits of the very notion of ―document‖, is per se a legitimate objective. A 
more specific definition could accelerate the identification and communication of the relevant 
information all the while minimising the impacts on the accomplishment of organisational 
objectives. This would, however, require agreed and transparent rules on the production and 
management of documents. Unfortunately, the Recast proposal omits to include any rules on 
the subject, opening new possibilities for the circumvention of the ATI process as such. 
Likewise, introducing some clear-cut rules imposing disclosure or confidentiality in well-
defined cases, where the current system requires cumbersome and potentially contentious 
―balancing acts‖ in each individual case, would probably be a sensible option. As the 
European Data Protection Supervisor puts it, the value of such provisions would lie in the fact 
that, by taking stock of experience so far, the legislator could give ―clear guidance‖ to public 
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authorities, correspondingly restricting their discretion
87
. The objective of expediency, 
standardisation and rationalisation of ATI procedures is essential. It is very much what is 
entailed by the current wave of pro-active disclosure used in many national governments. But 
for this goal to be achieved, rules allowing the identification of easily communicable 
documents would be required, not just the introduction of blanket exemptions. Unfortunately, 
the ―per se‖ rules introduced in the Recast proposal are perfectly one-sided: they all serve 
confidentiality and secrecy. 
In light of the above, it is not surprising that the Commission‘s proposal has come under 
heavy fire from the European Parliament, EU Ombudsman, EU Data Protection Supervisor, 
and civil society (not to mention the position of several Member States). Yet, some of the 
very general ideas that purportedly inspired it could serve in devising a more mature public 
access regime – one that is more focused, legally predictable, and balanced. Could these ideas 
be vindicated and rescued in the following steps of the legislative procedure? The 
opportunity, at least, exists. 
The European Parliament has expressed the strongest reservations on the Recast proposal, and 
has requested the Commission to come up with a new, more ―transparency-friendly‖ 
proposal
88
. In the worse-case scenario, the legislative process will grind to a halt due to 
irreconcilable differences. In this scenario Regulation 1049 will be merely aligned to the 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty
89
 – an ―improved status quo‖ that would, at any rate, be better 
than a faulty reform. In the best-case scenario, by contrast, the three institutions – Parliament, 
Council, and Commission – would enter into a ―trilogue‖ to place the legislative process on a 
new basis. ―Trilogues‖ are known to be the most characteristically opaque phase of EU law-
making procedures. In this case, paradoxically, they may be just what it takes to place the 
reform agenda back on track towards ―more‖ – and better – transparency in the EU. 
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